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Abstract—In emerging small cell wireless, each femtocell access
point (FAP) can either service its home subscribers exclusively (i.e.,
closed access) or open its access to accommodate a number of
macrocell users so as to reduce cross-tier interference. In this paper,
we propose a game-theoretic framework that enables the FAPs to
strategically decide on their uplink access policy. We formulate
a noncooperative game in which the FAPs are the players that
want to strategically decide on whether to use a closed or an
open access policy in order to maximize the performance of their
registered users. Each FAP aims at optimizing the tradeoff between
reducing cross-tier interference, by admitting macrocell users, and
the associated cost in terms of allocated resources. Using novel
analytical techniques, we show that the game always admits a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium, despite the discontinuities in the utility
functions. Further, we propose a distributed algorithm that can be
adopted by the FAPs to reach their equilibrium access policies.
Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm provides an
improvement of 85.4% relative to an optimized open access scheme
in the average worst-case FAP utility.
I. INTRODUCTION
Femtocell access points (FAPs) are low-cost, low-power base
stations that can be deployed in an indoor or an outdoor environ-
ment so as to satisfy the ever-increasing needs for high wireless
data rates. Overlaying existing networks with femtocells is a
promising solution to increase the capacity of wireless networks
as well as to deliver innovative wireless services.
The deployment of femtocell wireless networks introduces
numerous technical challenges. In particular, interference manage-
ment is challenging in two-tier femtocell networks due to the ab-
sence of coordination between the FAPs, which are often privately
owned, and the existing macrocell base stations. Several existing
works addressed the challenges of interference management in
femtocell networks [1], [2].
One characteristic of femtocell networks is the ability of the
FAPs to operate in three modes: closed access, open access, and
hybrid access (i.e., limited open access). In a closed access mode,
an FAP dedicates all of its resources to a specific number of
registered home users. Hence, in this mode, access to an FAP
is restricted to a handful of pre-registered subscribers (e.g., the
owners of the FAP). In contrast, in an open access mode, the
FAP can also service, along with its home users, nearby macrocell
users to reduce interference and to improve the overall network
performance. Hybrid access is a limited form of open access
in which only a specific number of macrocell users is allowed
to access the femtocell tier. The choice of an access policy can
strongly impact the network’s uplink performance as shown in [3],
this work was extended to the downlink in [4]. In [5], simulation
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results showed that the overall throughput in a network can be
enhanced when the FAP uses a hybrid access policy as opposed
to open access.
Most existing works on femtocell access modes have assumed
that the FAPs can operate exclusively either in closed, open, or
hybrid access [3]–[6]. In practice, due to their self-organization
capabilities, the FAPs have an incentive to strategically adapt
their access modes depending on the network status. In the
uplink, the FAPs face a tradeoff when deciding on their access
policy. For instance, allowing macrocell users to use the FAP
would potentially reduce the interference at the FAP, but it is
accompanied with a cost in terms of dedicating the FAP’s own
resources to these macrocell users. This gives rise to an interesting
competitive scenario. On the one hand, each FAP is interested
in optimizing the performance of its own registered users by
dedicating the maximum resources to them. On the other hand,
this FAP also has an incentive to service some macrocell users so
as to reduce the potentially harmful interference. These multiple
interests are often conflicting. Hence, it is of interest to devise
a scheme that allows the FAPs to strategically decide on their
preferred access policy.
The main contribution of this paper is to model and analyze the
conflicting access mode preferences of the FAPs in an overlaid
femtocell network. To this end, we formulate a noncooperative
game between the FAPs in which the strategy of each FAP
is to select an access mode to optimize the performance of
its home users, given the state of the network in terms of
macrocell user locations, network configuration, and others. We
characterize the optimal access policies for each FAP and we
show that the FAPs have an incentive to strategically select
their access modes, depending on their environment. Using novel
analytical techniques, we show the existence of a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium (PSNE) for the proposed game, despite the
discontinuities in the utility functions. We study this resulting
Nash equilibrium (NE) which dictates the access policies that will
be employed by the FAPs as captured by the amount of resources
allocated to the macrocell users. To solve the game, we present a
distributed algorithm that enables the FAPs to self-organize and
compute their equilibrium access policies with little coordination.
We study various properties of the equilibrium and show that the
proposed algorithm exhibits interesting characteristics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we
present the system model, and we formulate the noncooperative
game. We analyze the game in Section III and present a best
response distributed algorithm. Simulation results are presented
in Section IV, and conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the uplink of a network with M FAPs overlaid on
a macrocell wireless network having N users. Let the set of
FAPs be M = {1, ...,M} and the set of macrocell users be
N = {1, ..., N}. Hereinafter, we will refer to the registered FAP
users as femtocell user equipment (FUE) and to the macrocellular
users as macrocell user equipment (MUE). For multiple access,
we consider an OFDMA policy at both network tiers. Let K
be the total number of subcarriers available to each FAP. For
mathematical tractability, we consider that FUEs do not intro-
duce interference at neighboring FAPs, and, thus, there is no
uplink femtocell-to-femtocell interference. This can be achieved
by assigning orthogonal frequency bands to different FAPs using
dynamic OFDMA or other methods such as those in [1], [7].
We consider a Rayleigh fading channel having an exponentially
distributed magnitude with unit mean. We denote the channel
from the n-th MUE to the m-th FAP on the k-th subcarrier by
hnm[k]. Let Pn[k] be the transmit power of the n-th MUE on the
k-th subcarrier; the total transmit power of the n-th MUE is Pn,
with
∑K
k=1 Pn[k] ≤ Pn. Also, let the distance between the n-th
MUE and them-th FAP be dnm. Assume that each FAP services a
single FUE (our results can be readily extended to femtocells used
by multiple FUEs) having transmit power P0 distributed over the
subcarriers, i.e.,
∑K
k=1 P0[k] ≤ P0. We denote the channel from
each FUE to its corresponding FAP on the k-th subcarrier by
h0m[k] and the distance separating them by d0m. A zero-mean
circular complex Gaussian noise with variance σ2m[k] is added
on each subcarrier at the terminal of each FAP. The signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio at FAP m, SINRm, is given by:
SINRm[k] =
γm[k]
σ2m[k] +
∑N
n=1
(∏M
ℓ=1  {δℓn[k]=0}
)
µmn [k]
,
where γm[k] = |h0m[k]|
2P0[k]L(d0m)
−β is the received signal
power of the FUE on subcarrier k of FAP m. The constant
L < 1 is the wall penetration loss, and β is the path loss ex-
ponent for indoor-to-indoor communications. Similarly, µmn [k] =
|hnm[k]|
2Pn[k]d
−α
nm is the received signal power of the n-th MUE
on the k-th subcarrier of the m-th FAP, with α being the path
loss exponent for outdoor-to-indoor signalling.
Each FAP needs to decide on an access policy: closed, open,
or hybrid. Although closed access reserves the resources of an
FAP for its FUEs, it can potentially increase the interference in
a network. Open access reduces the interference at the price of
sharing the resources of the FAPs with MUEs. Hybrid access
strikes a balance between both policies as it constraints the
amount of resources shared with MUEs. The choice of an access
policy for an FAP depends, in addition to the interference levels
introduced by MUEs, on the policy choices of the other FAPs.
For example, an FAP prefers to use closed access and keep
its resources for the use of its FUEs solely, when other FAPs
decide to serve the interfering MUEs. Thus, given the scarce radio
spectrum, the FAPs become competitive when deciding on their
preferred access policy.
Hence, we define a noncooperative game between the FAPs
in which each FAP attempts to maximize the rate of its FUE,
by choosing an appropriate access policy. The type of access
employed by an FAP is captured by the resources it allocates to
the interfering MUE. In other words, the strategies of the FAPs
are the fractions of the spectrum that they can allocate to each
MUE, and the utilities are the rates of the FUEs.
Let δmn [k] ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether the k-th subcarrier of FAP
m is to be assigned to the n-th MUE – δmn [k] = 1 indicates that
the subcarrier is to be allocated to the MUE. The utility function
of FAP m can be written as:
U˜m(δm, δ−m) =
K∑
k=1
M∏
ℓ=1
 {δℓn[k]=0}
· log (1 + SINRm[k]) ,
where  {x=0} = 1 if and only if x = 0. The strategy vector
of FAP m is δm = [δ
m
1 [1], ..., δ
m
N [1], δ
m
1 [2], ..., δ
m
N [K]]
T , while
the strategy vectors of all other FAPs are given in δ−m =
[δT1 , ..., δ
T
m−1, δ
T
m+1, ..., δ
T
M ]
T .
If FAPm allocates subcarriers to an MUE, the rate of the MUE
should be at least as high as a target minimum rate Rcmin set by
the macrocell user – without loss of generality, we assume all
the MUEs to have the same target rate which is known in the
network a priori. Formally, we can write(
1−
K∏
k=1
 {δmn [k]=0}
)
Rcmin ≤
K∑
k=1
δmn [k] log
(
1 +
µmn [k]
σ2m[k]
)
(1)
The strategy space of FAP m is therefore
X˜m =
{
δm ∈ {0, 1}
NK :
N∑
n=1
δmn [k] ≤ 1, (1) is satisfied
}
.
The first constraint in X˜m ensures that a given subcarrier k at an
FAP m can be accessed by only one MUE. We can now write
the optimization problem to be solved by FAP m as:
For fixed δ−m, max U˜m(δm, δ−m) over δm ∈ X˜m. (2)
The outcome of this noncooperative game is governed by the
renowned solution concept of a Nash equilibrium. Formally:
Definition 1: A pair (δ⋆m, δ
⋆
−m) constitutes a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) if U˜m(δ
⋆
m, δ
⋆
−m) ≥
U˜m(δm, δ
⋆
−m), ∀δm∈ X˜m.
We are interested in studying the existence of a PSNE for
the above problem. However, problem (2) is challenging due the
following reasons: (i) the indicator functions make the objective
functions discontinuous; and (ii) the problem is combinatorial in
nature and requires exponential-time complexity to be solved. We
will address both of these challenges in the next section.
III. GAME FORMULATION AND PROPOSED ALGORITHM
A. Subband Allocation
Although the total number of decision variables in (2), M ·N ·
K, grows linearly in the number of subcarriers, the complexity
of the problem can be large in practice. In addition to subcarrier
allocation being combinatorial in nature [8], solving for the PSNE
increases the complexity as each FAP needs to consider all
possible subcarrier allocations and possible deviations of other
FAPs. Solving (2) is, thus, challenging.
Hereinafter, we consider that the channels are flat-fading or
that they do not vary over the frequency band available to each
FAP, which is a common assumption [3], [4]. Hence, OFDMA
is applied per subband rather than per subcarrier. When applied
over flat-fading channels, OFDMA is geared towards scheduling
users rather than resolving the inter-symbol interference in the
channel. We make use of this fact and formulate the problem as
a subband allocation problem instead of a subcarrier allocation
one. The subbands are defined as clusters of consecutive subcar-
riers. Hence, we assume that each FAP has a frequency band,
orthogonal to the bands of other FAPs, out of which it allocates
fractions to MUEs so as to maximize the rate of the FUE.
Let 0 ≤ ρmn ≤ 1 be the fraction of the band allocated by the
m-th FAP to the n-th MUE – ρm0 is the frequency band fraction
allocated to the FUE. Clearly, an FAP m with
∑N
i=1 ρ
m
i = 0 is
said to employ closed access. An FAP m is said to employ open
access if min{ρm1 , ..., ρ
m
N} > 0 and hybrid access if ∃n for which
ρmn > 0. In the remaining of this sequel, we will refer to both open
and hybrid access by open access; it should be understood that
by open access we mean either adopting all MUEs or employing
limited open access, depending on the network parameters. Thus,
the utility function of FAP m can be written as:
Um(ρm,ρ−m) = (1−
N∑
n=1
ρmn ) · log (1 + SINRm) , (3)
SINRm =
γm
σ2m +
∑N
n=1
(∏M
ℓ=1  {ρℓn=0}
)
µmn
,
where ρm = [ρ
m
1 , ..., ρ
m
N ]
T , and ρ−m are the decision variables
of all other FAPs1. The other variables are as defined above with
the subcarrier index k dropped. We will denote (ρm,ρ−m) by ρ.
The minimum rate constraint (1) becomes:(
1−  {ρmn =0}
)
·Rcmin ≤ ρ
m
n · log
(
1 +
µmn
σ2m
)
, (4)
and the strategy space of FAP m is now
Xm =
{
ρm ∈ [0, 1]
N :
N∑
n=0
ρmn = 1, (4) is satisfied
}
, (5)
where the first constraint ensures that the subband allocations are
well defined. Formally, the optimization in (2) becomes:
For fixed ρ−m, max Um(ρ) over ρm ∈ Xm. (6)
We will refer to this game by the strategic access policy (SAP)
game. With this formulation, we have overcome the complexity
associated with having a large number of subcarriers. However,
the objective function Um(ρ) is still discontinuous. We will
handle the discontinuities in the next subsection.
B. Existence of Pure Strategy NE (PSNE)
The discontinuities in the objective functions prevent us from
using standard theorems of continuous-kernel noncooperative
games, such as those in [9, pp. 173-179]. Here, we will apply
novel analytical techniques such as those in [10] to handle
discontinuities and show that the SAP game admits a PSNE.
Denote the Cartesian product of the strategy spaces of the
players by X = ×Mm=1Xm. Define the graph of the vector
of payoff functions as a subset of X × RM given by Γ ={
(ρ,U) ⊆ X × RM : U = [U1(ρ), ...,UM (ρ)]
T
}
. The closure of
Γ is denoted Γ¯. Before studying the PSNE for the SAP game, we
provide the following definitions from [10].
1We dropped ρm0 from the definition of ρm because ρ
m
0 = 1−
∑N
n=1 ρ
m
n
Definition 2: FAP m can secure a payoff Um(ρ) = ν ∈ R at
ρ if there exists a strategy ρ¯m such that Um(ρ¯m,ρ
′
−m) ≥ ν for
all ρ′−m in some open ǫ-neighborhood U
ǫ
−m of ρ−m.
In view of the above definition, an FAP m can secure a certain
payoff at ρ if it has a strategy that guarantees at least that payoff
even if other players deviate slightly.
Definition 3: A game is better-reply secure if for every (ρ,U)
in Γ¯ where ρ is a non-PSNE vector, some FAP m can secure a
payoff strictly greater than Um(ρ) that it achieves at ρ.
In essence, a game is said to be better-reply secure if whenever
ρ is a nonequilibrium vector achieving a utility U , some FAP m
possesses a strategy which would provide a payoff strictly better
than Um(ρ) even if all other players deviate slightly from ρ−m.
Lemma 1: For every ρ−m, the utility Um(.,ρ−m) is quasi-
concave in ρm, for all m.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Lemma 2: The SAP game is better-reply secure.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Theorem 1: The SAP game admits a PSNE.
Proof: For every m, the strategy space Xm is nonempty and
compact (a closed and bounded subset of the Euclidean space).
Also, Um(ρ) is bounded for all m. Those facts coupled with the
results of Lemmas 1 and 2 guarantee that Theorem 3.1 in [10],
which characterizes discontinuous games possessing PSNE, holds
true. Thus, the SAP game has PSNE.
C. Distributed Best Response Algorithm
Given the discontinuities in the utility functions, it is difficult
to obtain closed-form expressions for the PSNE solutions. Thus,
we propose a distributed best response algorithm that can be
implemented by the FAPs to reach a PSNE solution while
optimizing their strategies. The essence of the proposed algorithm
is to enable the FAPs to update their strategies, given their view
on the access modes used by all the other FAPs, at any point
in time. Thus, we develop a distributed algorithm based on best
response in order to find the equilibrium access policies.
The proposed algorithm is shown in Table I. The proposed
algorithm uses a parallel update technique in which, at any
iteration i, each FAP computes its optimal strategy given its
observation of the network at i − 1. The proposed algorithm
starts by selecting an initial strategy vector ρ(0) for the FAPs.
In each iteration i, each FAP m searches for the optimal set of
MUEs N
(i)
m that it can serve, given its view on the access policies
(i.e., strategies) of all of the other FAPs which were obtained in
the previous iteration ρ
(i−1)
m . The set N
(i)
m is selected so as to
maximize the utility of the FUE of FAP m over Xm (note that
N
(i)
m can be ∅). The MUEs in N
(i)
m are allocated subbands as per
(7), using the logic in the proof of Lemma 2.
To find its best response, each FAP needs to identify the optimal
subset of MUEs to admit, if it chooses an open access strategy. To
do so, the FAP needs to check its potential utility from servicing a
certain subset of MUEs. In practice, instead of testing all possible
sets of MUEs, which can be complex, the FAP could find this
optimal subset using a branch and bound or a greedy algorithm.
An FAP has, in general, a limited coverage area in which the
number of MUEs is often reasonable, and, hence, identifying the
TABLE I
PROPOSED ALGORITHM
Select a random initial strategy vector ρ(0).
For all n ∈ N , m ∈M, compute ρm⋆n as per (7).
iterate
for m = 1→M
Fix ρ
(i−1)
−m .
Select the optimal set of users N
(i)
m to be served by FAP m.
Set ρ
m,(i)
n = ρ
m⋆
n , ∀n ∈ N
(i)
m . Set ρ
m,(i)
n = 0, ∀n /∈ N
(i)
m .
end
if ρ
m,(i)
n > 0 for multiple values of m
Pair the n-th MUE to FAP j to which µjn is highest.
Set ρ
−j,(i)
n = 0.
end
until convergence to a PSNE vector ρ⋆
best response would require an acceptable complexity. In this
respect, a simple greedy algorithm in which the FAP starts by
accepting the top interfering MUEs first (a similar approach was
used in [3] for handoff) could be adopted for finding the optimal
response while reducing complexity. At the end of each iteration,
the algorithm ensures that no MUE is being served by multiple
FAPs. The MUE is paired with the FAP to which it has the best
channel as characterized by µmn . Note that if the remaining FAPs
still allocate resources to this MUE, they will be at a disadvantage
as they would be wasting resources. The above steps are repeated
until convergence. In general, best response based algorithms such
as the one proposed in Table I have been shown to converge to
an NE for many classes of noncooperative games; many modified
schemes have also been proposed to ensure convergence [9].
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
Consider a network of FAPs and MUEs that are scattered
uniformly over a 250 m × 250 m square. We set the noise power
added at the terminals of the FAPs to σ2m = −110 dBm, for all
m. The transmit power of all FUEs and MUEs is fixed at 100
mW. The wall penetration loss is set to L = 0.5, and the path
loss factors are set to α = 3, β = 2. All MUEs have a minimum
target rate requirement of Rcmin = 5 bits. We fix d0m = 1 m
for all FAPs. All statistical results are averaged over the random
channels and locations of all nodes.
We will benchmark the performance of our algorithm through
comparisons with two different schemes. In the first scheme,
referred to as the all closed scheme, all FAPs use closed access
at all times. In the second scheme, all FAPs use open access
while optimizing their allocated resources, as per (7), in a manner
similar to our algorithm. We refer to this scheme by optimized
open access. The latter is a particular case of our proposed scheme
in which the FAPs choose to employ open access and allocate
resources (if possible) without seeking equilibrium or stability;
this scheme is used as the initial point for our scheme.
In Fig. 1, we show the fraction of FAPs that choose an open
policy at the PSNE resulting from the proposed approach for
networks with 7 MUEs and 10 MUEs as the number of FAPs
varies. In this figure, we can see that the fraction of FAPs
choosing open access starts by increasing because deploying more
FAPs leads to more opportunities for open access. However, this
fraction starts decreasing forM ≥ 6 when N = 7, and forM ≥ 8
when N = 10. For N = 7, it reaches a maximum of 64% and
then starts by decreasing to reach 34.5%. For N = 10, it reaches a
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Fig. 1. Fraction of FAPs using open access as the number of FAPs varies.
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Fig. 2. Average rate per FAP resulting from the proposed algorithm as the
number of FAPs M varies for a network with 10 MUEs.
maximum of 60.8% and then starts by decreasing to reach 43.9%.
This is due to the fact that for a given number of MUEs, as the
number of FAPs becomes much larger than the number of MUEs,
the additional FAPs tend to remain closed as they rely on other
FAPs to service the interfering MUEs. Clearly, most equilibria are
composed of mixed access policies: a fraction of FAPs choosing
open access and another fraction choosing closed access, with
this fraction dependent on various parameters such as M or N .
In Fig. 2, we assess the performance of the PSNE resulting
from the proposed algorithm by showing the average utility
per FAP as the network size varies, for 10 MUEs. First, we
can see that as M increases, the average utility per FAP for
the proposed scheme and the optimized open access scheme
increases. This is due to the fact that as more FAPs are deployed,
there exists more opportunities to use open access and service
highly interfering MUEs. In contrast, the all closed scheme
yields an almost constant average utility at all network sizes.
Fig. 2 shows that the proposed scheme yields significant gains
with respect to the all closed scheme reaching up to 173.8% at
M = 16 FAPs. This figure also highlights the interesting tradeoff
between stability (PSNE) and performance. For small networks,
the optimized open access scheme outperforms the PSNE state.
However, this scheme is not stable, in the Nash sense. This is
because the optimized open access scheme is the starting point of
our algorithm, and the FAPs were able to improve their utilities by
unilaterally deviating from it. Nonetheless, the performance gap
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Fig. 3. Average worst-case FAP rate resulting from the proposed algorithm as
the number of FAPs M varies for a network with 10 MUEs.
is reasonable. Moreover, as more FAPs are deployed, the Nash
solution coincides with the optimized open access network.
In Fig. 3, we show the average worst-case utility. This demon-
strates that, although our scheme has a performance gap in the
average rate when compared to the optimized open access scheme
as in Fig. 2, it can improve the worst-case FAP’s performance. Our
scheme reaches an improvement of 85.4% compared to optimized
open access atM = 4; it also reaches an improvement of 208.9%
over the all closed scheme at M = 16. This is a result of the
selfish nature of the FAPs as captured by the PSNE solution.
The PSNE ensures that no FAP can do better by unilaterally
deviating from the equilibrium; hence, it is expected that, when
acting strategically, no FAP will make a decision that decrease its
own utility for the advantage of another, although this decision
may also be detrimental to the overall welfare of the network.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a novel game-theoretic
framework which enables the FAPs to strategically decide on their
uplink access policies. Due to the absence of coordination among
FAPs, we have formulated a noncooperative game in which the
FAPs strategically optimize the rates of their home FUEs, given
the tradeoff between reducing the cross-tier interference and the
associated cost due to sharing their resources. We have applied
novel analytical techniques to prove the existence of the Nash
equilibrium solution for the proposed game in which the utility
functions are discontinuous. Moreover, we have proposed a low-
complexity distributed algorithm that can be adopted by the FAPs
to reach their equilibrium access policies through parallel updates.
Simulation results assessed the performance of the proposed
approach in various settings.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1: A function f(x) is said to be
quasiconcave if every superlevel set Sν = {x|f(x) ≥ ν} is
a convex set. Define the set Nm = {n : ρ−mn = 0}. When
ν ≤ 0, Um(ρ) ≥ 0 implies that ρm ∈ Xm. The strategy
space of FAP m is a convex set since it is the intersection
of an (N + 1)-dimensional simplex and halfspaces which are
convex sets. Hence, the superlevel sets in this case are convex
sets. When 0 < ν ≤ log(1 + γm
σ2m+
∑
n∈Nm
µmn
), where the
upper bound on ν corresponds to the payoff obtained when
FAP m employs closed access, Um(ρ) ≥ ν implies that 0 ≤
1
Tρm ≤ 1−
ν
log(1+ γm
σ2m
)
. The superlevel sets in this case are also
convex sets because they are intersections of halfspaces. Similarly,
when ν > log(1 + γm
σ2m+
∑
n∈Nm
µmn
), Um(ρ) ≥ ν implies that
0 < 1Tρm ≤ 1−
ν
log(1+ γm
σ2m
)
. The superlevel sets in this case are
also convex sets. Finally, if ν > log(1+ γm
σ2m
), then Sν = ∅ which
is also a convex set. The proof of the lemma is thus complete.
B. Proof of Lemma 2: Consider a nonequilibrium vector
ρ. Given the constraints of (6) and the fact that Um(ρ) is
monotonically decreasing in ρmn > 0, we can find the optimal
subband allocation by FAP m to the n-th MUE (in open access):
ρm⋆n =
Rcmin
log
(
1 +
µmn
σ2m
) . (7)
Let ρ¯m be the resulting strategy after transforming ρm as follows:
I-a) Set ρ¯mn = 0 whenever ρ
−m
n > 0. This ensures that
whenever the n-th MUE is allocated a subband by an FAP,
FAP m takes advantage of the fact that an MUE can only
connect to one FAP and refrains from spending extra resources;
I-b) Set ρ¯mn = ρ
m⋆
n whenever ρ
m
n > 0 and ρ
−m
n = 0. This
ensures that FAP m allocates the smallest possible subband to
the n-th MUE. Clearly, Um(ρ¯m,ρ−m) > Um(ρ), where the
assumption that ρ is nonequilibrium was crucial in finding ρ¯m.
Let U ǫ−m be an ǫ-neighborhood, ǫ > 0, of ρ−m given by
U ǫ−m = {ρ´−m ∈ X−m :
∣∣∣∣ρ−m − ρ´−m∣∣∣∣ < ǫ}. We make the
following two observations: II-a) We can always select an ǫ > 0
such that if ρ−m ∋ ρ
ℓ
n > 0, it still holds that ρ´−m ∋ ρ´
ℓ
n > 0.
Hence, by I-a, ρ¯m would still yield a better payoff for FAP m
even if such deviations occur; II-b) If ρ−m ∋ ρ
−m
n = 0, then
ρ´−mn > 0. In this case, the utility of FAP m will not be affected
as, by I-b, that MUE is allocated a subband at ρ¯m. By II-a and
II-b, we readily conclude that Um(ρ¯m, ρ´−m) ≥ Um(ρ¯m,ρ−m).
Hence, FAP m can secure a payoff Um(ρ¯m,ρ−m) at ρ¯m which
is strictly greater than Um(ρ). Thus, the SAP game is better-reply
secure.
